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This paper studies procyclical productivity growth at the industry level in the United States and three
European countries (France, Germany and the Netherlands). Industry-speciﬁc demand-side instruments
are used to examine the prevalence of non-constant returns to scale and unmeasured input utilization. For
the aggregate US economy, unmeasured input utilization seems to explain procyclical productivity.
However, this correction still leaves one in three US industries with procyclical productivity. This failure of
the model can also be seen in Europe and is mostly concentrated in services industries.
INTRODUCTION
In the short run, output growth and productivity tend to move together in many
countries and across a wide range of industries. In recent years this observation has
gained increased prominence, as each proposed explanation for the observed
procyclicality has important implications for modelling the business cycle and measuring
productivity growth.
The goal of this paper is to evaluate the role of increasing returns to scale and
unmeasured input utilization in explaining procyclical productivity growth, as earlier
research ﬁnds these factors to be important (Basu and Fernald 2001). The eventual aim is
to better understand short-run changes in productivity growth and how ﬁrms adjust to
[adverse] changes in demand. The analysis is carried out in a production function
framework using a recent, internationally consistent, data-set for three European
countries and the United States.
This paper is the ﬁrst to test directly whether the Basu–Fernald (2001) model is
similarly successful in reducing output-productivity correlations outside the United
States, and the extent to which it is successful not only at the aggregate but also at the
industry level. I conﬁrm the main ﬁnding of Basu and Fernald (2001) for the aggregate
US economy, but also show that the Basu–Fernald model does not explain much beyond
this. Even after correcting for possible non-constant returns to scale and unmeasured
input utilization, around one in three US industries still show signiﬁcant procyclical
productivity growth, and a considerable number of these are located outside of
manufacturing.
In France and Germany aggregate cyclicality decreases as in the United States, but
the failure of the Basu–Fernald (2001) model for many industries can be seen in each of
the European countries (France, Germany and the Netherlands). One possible reason for
this ﬁnding is that the proxy for unmeasured input utilizationFaverage hours worked
per personFis not very relevant in Europe or in service industries. Better proxies and
more attention to cross-industry heterogeneity, as in Hart and Malley (1999), would
probably be helpful.
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The second ﬁnding is of a more technical nature, but is nevertheless important for the
analysis in this paper. Identiﬁcation of the production functions estimated in this
literature tends to rely on relatively weak demand-side instruments. Following Shea
(1993) and Baily et al. (2001), I construct a set of industry-speciﬁc instruments capturing
downstream intermediate demand. A recently developed statistical test conﬁrms that
these are less prone to weak-instrument bias than the more commonly used instruments
such as the real oil price. Therefore the use of these downstream indicators allows for a
greater degree of conﬁdence in the estimates presented here than in some of the other
studies in this literature.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. First, the main stylized facts of cyclical
productivity are introduced alongside the most important proposed explanations for this
phenomenon from the literature. Section II then presents the theoretical framework for
the analysis. Section III discusses the estimation framework and the data used in this
study. Results are shown in Section IV, ﬁrst with regards to the production function
estimates, and then focusing on the cyclicality of the productivity residuals. Section V
summarizes and discusses some of the implications of the results.
I. BACKGROUND
One of the more robust stylized facts in the macroeconomic literature is that output and
productivity move together in the short run. Table 1 illustrates this by showing the
correlation between output growth and total factor productivity (TFP) growth in
European countries and the United States. With few exceptions, the correlations are
positive and highly signiﬁcant. Although other ﬁltering methods could have been used, I
focus on these correlations mainly because Basu and Fernald (2001) do so.
Three explanations for cyclical productivity are popular in the literature: (i)
procyclical technology shocks, (ii) increasing returns to scale and (iii) unmeasured input
utilization.1 The ﬁrst explanation is the most obvious: if technology shows transitory,
high-frequency ﬂuctuations, it should not come as a surprise that output will show
similar ﬂuctuations, and hence productivity will be procyclical. This argues in favour of
models where technology drives the business cycle as in Real Business Cycle theory (e.g.
Cooley and Prescott 1995). Under increasing returns to scale, a decline in inputs in a
recession will lead to a more than proportionate decline in output and hence will lower
output per unit of input. If these increasing returns are related to imperfect competition,
TABLE 1
Correlation betweenTotal Factor Productivity and GDP Growth, Europe and
the United States 1979–2001
Austria 0.59n Italy 0.46n
Belgium 0.53n Netherlands 0.42
Denmark 0.56n Portugal 0.51n
Finland 0.75n Spain  0.46n
France 0.56n Sweden 0.65n
Germany 0.67n UK 0.54n
Greece 0.71n USA 0.89n
Ireland 0.68n
Notes: nDenotes a correlation signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 5% level.
Source: Timmer and van Ark (2005).
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changes in government expenditure can lead directly to procyclical productivity.2
Increasing returns can also be due to external effects, implying that output in an industry
can affect output in other industries, and these effects need to be modelled.3 If the third
explanation holds, ﬁrms adjust not only measured inputs such as capital and labour, but
also unmeasured inputs such as the utilization rate of capital or the labour effort per
hour worked. Therefore, during a growth slowdown or a recession, the decline in
productive inputs will be understated and observed productivity will be procyclical.
Differences in the importance of these explanations can also shed important light on
the effect of the institutional structure across countries. For example, as Vecchi (2000)
shows, Japanese ﬁrms hoard more labour than American ﬁrms because of lower
transaction costs in Japan, and this affects the dynamics of the economies in question.
Different explanations for cyclical productivity also have different implications for
the interpretation of productivity growth. Researchers such as Gordon (1993, 2000) try
to separate the ‘cyclical’ from the ‘structural’ part of productivity growth. This approach
might be useful to isolate a more accurate measure of productivity growth if unmeasured
input utilization were the leading cause for procyclical productivity growth. However,
as Basu and Fernald (2001) argue, if reallocations are important, cyclical productivity is
a ‘structural’ phenomenon since it reﬂects the ability of ﬁrms to produce output given
a certain level of inputs. As a result, a more formal analysis is needed to identify
movements in production possibilities.
There is an extensive literature that tries to distinguish between the various
explanations of procyclical productivity.4 Most of these papers focus on the US, but
there is international evidence as well, most notably from Caballero and Lyons (1990),
Oliveira Martins et al. (1996), Vecchi (2000) and Marchetti and Nucci (2005), but these
studies are mostly conﬁned to production function and related estimates. In a recent
study for the US, Basu and Fernald (2001) use production function estimates to evaluate
whether these can decrease the correlation between output and the technology residual
they estimate. On the basis of this exercise Basu and Fernald (2001) conclude that there is
only a limited role for increasing returns to scale outside durable manufacturing and that
unmeasured input utilization and reallocations explain the cyclicality of aggregate US
productivity.5 In this paper the same approach is used to see whether their conclusions
extend apply to individual industries and other countries as well. First I discuss the
production model that lies at the basis of the empirical analysis.
II. A MODEL OF CYCLICAL PRODUCTIVITY
This section discusses a model that is commonly used to study the cyclicality of
productivity growth.6 A ﬁrm produces using the following production function:
ð1Þ Y ¼ FðzK ; eHN;M;AÞ
Output, denoted by Y, is produced using capital K, workers N, average hours worked
H and intermediate inputs M, given the state of production technology A. Additional
choice variables for the ﬁrm are the intensity of capital use z and the level of labour effort
e. In a model with costless input adjustment, these last variables are irrelevant. However,
if labour and capital are quasi-ﬁxed inputs, ﬁrms adjust to shocks in the short run by
varying average hours worked, labour effort and the intensity of capital use. Following
Basu and Fernald (2001), we think of the z as being determined by the number of shifts
and higher intensity of capital use is costly due to a shift premium.7
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Along similar lines, the ﬁrm can pay its workers more in order to ensure higher effort
levels, given the number of hours worked per worker. If this extra compensation is in the
form of better promotion chances or spread out over several years, it will not fully show
up in the labour compensation ﬁgures of any single year. Furthermore, the level of effort
can be interpreted directly as the intensity of work, but reasoning along similar lines, an
employee might divide his time between immediately productive work and training or
other learning activities. In that case, the ﬁrm might simply shift workers from non-
productive to productive work without having to pay a higher wage immediately. The
cost would lie in the fact that future labour productivity improvements will be lower as
less human capital will have been accumulated.8
If the ﬁrm is a price taker on the market for factor inputs and minimizes cost, inputs
will be purchased up to the point where the marginal product equals factor prices. This
means we can construct an input growth index (see e.g. Basu and Fernald, 1997):
ð2Þ dX ¼ sL deþ dH þ dNð Þ þ sK dzþ dKð Þ þ sMdM;
where d(  ) denotes the percentage growth of the variable and sx is the two-period average
share input x in total cost.9 Note that equation (2) gives the To¨rnqvist approximation to
the continuous-time Divisia index of input growth. This way, very few restrictions are
placed on the underlying production function.
The standard calculation of total factor productivity growth as the Solow residual
subtracts the growth of inputs from the growth of output, but this will give a valid
measure of technical change only under constant returns to scale. In general, if we
assume neutral technical change, the relationship is as follows:
ð3Þ dY ¼ gdX þ dA;
where g denotes the returns to scale. The problem with estimating (3) is that effort levels
and the intensity of capital use are usually not observable and we measure only a biased
version of equation (2):
ð4Þ dXn ¼ sL dH þ dNð Þ þ sKdK þ sMdM ¼ dX  sLde sKdz:
The usual solution to this problem is to ﬁnd a proxy for input utilization. For the
manufacturing sector, a number of researchers have used survey measures of capacity
utilization (i.e. Shapiro 1996). Other studies have proposed energy use or materials use as
a proxy for capital utilization (e.g. Burnside et al. 1995). However, such measures are
silent on labour utilization or are not available outside manufacturing, so alternatives are
needed. Abbott et al. (1998) proposed using changes in average hours worked as a proxy
for both labour and capital utilization. This was later formalized in the model of Basu
and Kimball (1997), whose rationale for this proxy is that, if optimizing ﬁrms adjust
inputs along one margin, namely average hours worked, they will also adjust along
unobserved margins. As long as labour effort increases if average hours worked are
increased, growth in average hours worked will be a valid proxy for labour utilization.
Similarly, if the only way to increase capital utilization in the short run is to increase the
number of shifts, and hence average hours worked, the growth in average hours worked
will also be a good proxy for capital utilization. Equation (3) can then be written entirely
in terms of observable variables:10
ð5Þ dY ¼ gdXn þ gxdH þ dA:
Although data on average hours worked are available for all sectors of the economy,
the interpretation of this variable as a proxy for unmeasured input utilization seems to be
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most relevant for manufacturing industries. Most non-manufacturing industries do not
work in shifts, and many workers are not paid by the hour, leading to less reliable
measures of hours worked. Another proxy, which is also available economy-wide, is
intermediate inputs use. The reasoning for this proxy, as originally advanced by Basu
(1996), is that if capital and labour utilization go up this is reﬂected partly in higher use of
intermediates such as energy or raw materials. However, intermediate inputs make up on
average nearly half of all input cost, so one would expect parameter g adequately to pick
up any utilization effects as well. Adding changes in intermediate use per hour worked, as
done by Vecchi (2000), may be problematic, since intermediate use is then included as
part of input growth and as a separate explanatory variable.11
No explicit role is given to external effects in equation (5), although some researchers
such as Caballero and Lyons (1990, 1992) and Vecchi (2000) argue their importance.
There are two reasons for this. First, adding aggregate output growth to (5) may indeed
pick up the effect of growth in other industries, but, as Sbordone (1997) argues, it could
also be a proxy for demand-induced utilization changes. Second, while it is interesting to
know whether increasing returns to scale are internal or external to the ﬁrm or industry,
in the present paper the main focus is on whether returns to scale can explain procyclical
productivity growth. Equation (5) gives the general estimation framework to analyse the
cyclicality of productivity growth.12 A number of data and econometric issues need to be
dealt with ﬁrst, however.
III. METHODS AND DATA
Econometric methodology
We estimate two speciﬁcations, one including only the returns-to-scale parameter g, and
another including both returns to scale and the correction for unmeasured input
utilization in the form of parameter x:
ð6aÞ dYi;j;t ¼ mi;j þ g1j dXni;j;t þ e1i;j;t;
ð6bÞ dYi;j;t ¼ mi;j þ g2j dXni;j;t þ xjdHi;j;t þ e2i;j;t:
Output growth of industry i in country j at time t is the dependent variable in both
regressions. In (6a) measured input growth is the only explanatory variable, while in (6b)
the growth in average hours worked is included to proxy for unmeasured input
utilization changes. Input growth is a weighted average of the growth in labour, capital
and intermediate inputs (equation (4)). In both speciﬁcations a country/industry ﬁxed
effect, mi,j is also included.
One of the main goals of this exercise is to determine the extent to which European
countries show different results from the United States, so the parameters are allowed to
vary by country. Productivity growth is accounted for partly in the ﬁxed effect and partly
in the residuals ei,j. The results from Basu and Fernald (2001) suggest that (6a) should
give returns-to-scale estimates signiﬁcantly greater than 1, while in (6b), signiﬁcant
increasing returns should disappear and instead give signiﬁcantly positive estimates of x.
Note that in equation (5), parameter x was interacted with g. In practice, taking this
nonlinearity into account has little effect on the results, as g is close to one.
One of the objectives of this paper is to come up with comparable estimates to those
of Basu and Fernald (2001), but in speciﬁcation (6b) growth in average hours worked is
included both as part of input growth and as a separate explanatory variable. This is
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likely to bias the elasticity estimates, so a modiﬁed version of (6b) is also estimated, where
input growth is calculated excluding growth in average hours worked.
An important problem with estimating (6a) and (6b) is that optimizing ﬁrms set their
levels of inputs and outputs simultaneously in response to productivity shocks. Therefore
we need variables unrelated to industry productivity shocks to identify g and x. Most of
the literature has relied on relatively weak instruments, such as the world price of oil
(Hall 1988), to estimate variants of (6a) and (6b) and some have even decided to rely on
OLS estimates to avoid small-sample bias in IV estimates (e.g. Diewert and Fox 2004).
To lessen the weak-instrument problem, in this paper I use downstream indicators of
industry demand. Shea (1993) proposed the use of input–output tables to identify
industries with close demand links but relatively modest reverse links. Take for example
the metal industry and the car industry: output changes in the car industry will likely
induce higher demand in the metal industry, so growth in the car industry is certainly
relevant. In this case, however, it is not clear whether output changes in the car industry
are also exogenous to productivity shocks in the metal industry, because a notable part of
intermediate inputs of the car industry come from the metal industry. Baily et al. (2001)
constructed a weighted average of growth in downstream industries using all industries
that buy output from a certain industry and for which these purchases represent less than
5% of intermediate inputs. In constructing the downstream indicators for the present
paper, I followed the same procedure.
It is useful at this point to compare how the various instrument sets fare when
confronted with the data (described in more detail below). As shown by Stock and Yogo
(2004), the F-statistic from the ﬁrst-stage regression of the explanatory variable and the
instruments is a useful test statistic with which to gauge the strength of the instruments.
The ﬁrst and third columns of Table 2 show the average F-statistic across industries
based on the ﬁrst-stage regressions that try to explain (measured) input growth by the
current value and one lag of the downstream indicator for each industry in each country.
The second and fourth columns show the same results from regressions with the so-called
‘Hall–Ramey’ instruments as explanatory variables.13 As the table shows, in each
country the downstream indicators generate a considerably better ﬁt than the more
TABLE 2
Comparing the Fit of First-Stage Regressions of Instrument Sets on the Growth
of Inputs: Downstream Indicator v. Hall–Ramey Instruments
Average ﬁrst-stage F-statistic
Number of industries with IV bias
less than 10% of OLS bias
Downstream indicator Hall–Ramey Downstream indicator Hall–Ramey
France 13.5 3.7 15 0
Germany 11.3 3.7 11 1
Netherlands 13.6 4.3 12 1
USA 13.6 6.2 9 4
Notes:
First and third columns: regression with the growth of inputs as dependent variable and the current value and
one lag of the downstream indicator as independent variables. Second and fourth columns: regression with the
growth of inputs as dependent variable and the current value and one lag of oil price change and growth of real
government spending as independent variables. Third and fourth columns: number of industries where the ﬁrst-
stage F-statistic exceeds the critical value of 9.08 (third column) and 10.85 (fourth column), using Table 1 of
Stock and Yogo (2004).
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widely used Hall–Ramey instruments.14 In quite a number of the 24 industries in this
study, the simultaneity bias inherent in OLS estimation can be reduced by 90% or more
by using the downstream indicators, while the Hall–Ramey instruments lead to estimates
that are much more biased towards the OLS estimates.15 On the basis of these results, we
will rely on the downstream indicators to estimate equations (6a) and (6b).
Data
A quite extensive data-set is needed to estimate the model discussed in Section I. Data are
collected on gross output, intermediate inputs, capital services and labour input for 24
market industries in France, Germany, Netherlands and the United States. The period
covered is 1979–2001.
For data on capital by asset type and hours worked by skill type in this paper I rely
on previous work (see Inklaar et al. 2005). For each country, investment data are
available for six asset types: computers, communications equipment, software, non-IT
machinery, transport equipment and non-residential structures. For France, Netherlands
and the United States, these investment data are available as detailed investment matrices
from the national statistical ofﬁces. In the case of Germany, investment ﬁgures from the
National Accounts are supplemented with results from investment surveys by the Ifo
Institut (see Appendix A of Inklaar et al. 2005). From those data, capital stocks are
estimated using the perpetual inventory method and asset depreciation rates from the US
Bureau of Economic Analysis (see Fraumeni 1997). Given the large differences in how
statistical ofﬁces across countries account for quality change of ICT products, I used US
price indices to deﬂate ICT investment and the output of ICT-producing industries, after
adjusting for differences in the general inﬂation level. To aggregate across asset types, the
gross rate of return on each capital asset is calculated as
ð7Þ rit ¼ REt þ dit  _Pit:
The gross return of asset i for industry j at time t is equal to an external rate of return
R, assumed equal to the government bond yield (from the IMF’s International Financial
Statistics) plus the asset depreciation rate d minus the investment price change of the
asset _P.16
Data on labour input by educational attainment are from national labour force
surveys. Owing to differences in the educational system, we do not have the same number
of categories in each country: they vary between three categories for Germany and seven
for the Netherlands. Information on the wages of each labour type was used to aggregate
across different skill categories. Finally, average hours worked by industry are from the
GGDC (2003) 60-industry database.
The data from Inklaar et al. (2005) are supplemented with information on gross
output at current and constant prices from the National Accounts of the various
countries. Especially for the 1980s, prices for gross output are frequently not given in the
National Accounts. In such cases I either used producer price indexes or estimated prices
on the basis of implicit value added deﬂators. Intermediate inputs were implicitly
estimated from gross output and value added at constant prices. In addition to the
growth of each input, the share of labour, capital and intermediate inputs are also needed
to compute an aggregate input index. The main issue lies in estimating self-employed
labour income, as this is included as part of capital income. As in Inklaar et al. (2005),
data for the United States from Jorgenson et al. (2005) were used to estimate that at the
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aggregate level self-employed wages are on average 70% of employee wages. This ratio is
applied to each industry and country.
To construct the downstream indicator for each country, information is needed on
deliveries by industry x to industry y. For this I used benchmark input–output tables for
each of the countries.17 Although the sales shares of industries are likely to change over
time, experiments using annual input–output tables for the Netherlands show that the
impact on the indicators is limited. Therefore only a single input–output table is used for
1995 (France and the Netherlands), 1997 (United States) and 2000 (Germany). The
downstream indicators are calculated at the industry detail of the 60-industry database
and then aggregated to the level of the 24 market industries in this paper. Finally, the
indicators are limited to intermediate demand.
IV. RESULTS
Production function estimates
In this subsection the estimation results from equations (6a) and (6b) are presented. In all
cases, two-stage least squares is used to estimate the parameters with the current value
and one lag of the industry-speciﬁc downstream indicators as instruments. To improve
efﬁciency, ﬁrst-stage coefﬁcients are allowed to vary by industry.18 The standard errors of
the parameters have been corrected for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity using the
procedure of Newey and West (1987).
As discussed in the previous section, three speciﬁcations are considered: equation
(6a), equation (6b) with growth of average hours worked included in the aggregate
input measure, and equation (6b) with growth in average hours worked excluded. To
save space, Table 3 shows these three speciﬁcations only for the United States.19 The
results are shown for groups of industries, as the time-series dimension (21 observations)
is too short for reliable inference at the industry level; indeed, for some individual
industries very large, very small and even negative returns to scale are found (see
Appendix Table A3).
The ﬁrst column of results in Table 3 shows that, without a utilization proxy, returns
to scale are signiﬁcantly greater than 1 at the level of the market economy and in durable
manufacturing. By adding the growth of average hours worked, the returns-to-scale
estimates go down in nearly all industry groups, and they become insigniﬁcant for
the market economy and the non-farm, non-mining market economy. However, the
utilization proxy is signiﬁcantly different from zero only for the market economy.
The exclusion of average hours worked from aggregate input growth raises the utilization
coefﬁcients, so that they are signiﬁcantly different from zero for all industry groups
except services.
To see the extent to which the results in Table 3 depend on the speciﬁc data-set used,
Table 4 presents a series of estimates using the data from Basu, Fernald and Kimball
(2004), hereafter referred to as BFK. The analysis of BFK is concerned not primarily
with the relation between productivity growth and output growth, but instead with the
correlation between productivity and input growth. However, their paper presents their
most recent estimates of equation (6b), and their data could be acquired for comparison
purposes.20
Column (1) of Table 4 shows results directly taken from BFK, while column (6)
shows comparable results from Table 3. Columns (2)–(5) show, step by step, the effects of
moving from BFK’s estimation to the estimation in this paper by changing the estimation
method, the instruments used, the time period covered and whether or not changes in
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average hours worked are included in aggregate inputs.21 The table shows that these
changes do not have a strong effect on the parameter estimates. When restricting the
sample to the post-1979 period, durable manufacturing shows increasing instead of
constant returns to scale, but there are no other statistically signiﬁcant differences. The
point estimates for the utilization correction change noticeably from column to column,
especially in services, but for the most part this reﬂects the greater uncertainty
surrounding these estimates. Given the stability of the main ﬁndings, we now move to the
international evidence in Table 5.
A few results stand out in Table 5. First, the evidence on returns to scale is very
mixed. Those for France resemble those for the United States, with some signiﬁcantly
increasing returns in manufacturing but returns to scale that are indistinguishable from 1
in the rest of the economy. Germany, though, shows signiﬁcant increasing returns in all
sectors, while all industry groups in the Netherlands have constant returns to scale. When
it comes to the proxy for unmeasured input utilization, only the US coefﬁcients are
consistently positive and signiﬁcant in nearly all industry groups. In the other countries,
the point estimates suggest that there are both positive and negative effects of extra hours
worked on output, but, with the exception of durable manufacturing in Germany, none
of the coefﬁcients is signiﬁcant. This suggests that European ﬁrms do not vary the
average number of hours worked in response to short-run ﬂuctuations in demand in a
TABLE 3
Estimates of Returns to Scale and a Correction for Unmeasured Input






RTS Util. RTS Util.
Market economy 1.11n 0.96 0.92n 0.97 1.17n
(0.05) (0.09) (0.36) (0.09) (0.34)
Market economy excluding agriculture
& mining
1.16n 1.08 0.44 1.09 0.72n
(0.03) (0.06) (0.22) (0.06) (0.21)
Durable manufacturing 1.26n 1.17n 0.49 1.18n 0.84n
(0.05) (0.08) (0.35) (0.08) (0.33)
Non-durable manufacturing 1.07 0.88 0.77 0.91 0.93n
(0.06) (0.15) (0.47) (0.15) (0.44)
Non-manufacturing 0.82 0.73 1.27 0.74 1.49n
(0.13) (0.16) (0.76) (0.16) (0.72)
Services 0.99 1.02  0.26 1.02 0.13
(0.07) (0.08) (0.37) (0.08) (0.35)
Notes:
Table shows parameter estimates from regressions using US data with output growth as the dependent variable
and growth of inputs (RTS) as the independent variable and with both growth of inputs (RTS) and growth of
average hours worked (Util.) as explanatory variables. For the results labelled ‘Ave. hours included’, growth in
average hours worked is included in growth of inputs, while for ‘Ave. hours excluded’ this is not the case.
Estimation is done for a panel of industries, with industry ﬁxed effects included (not shown) using two-stage
least squares with the current value and one lag of the downstream indicator for each industry as instruments.
Parameters in the ﬁrst-stage regression are allowed to vary across industries. Standard errors, consistent for
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, are shown in parentheses.
nDenotes parameters signiﬁcantly different from one (RTS) or from zero (Util.) at the 5% level. See Table A3
for deﬁnitions of industry groupings
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systematic way. A possible explanation is that adjustment instead takes place by reducing
the number of (temporary) workers. A more complete answer would require further
research, but I now turn to the question of whether the estimated models help reduce the
cyclicality of the productivity residuals.
Cyclicality of productivity residuals
Basu and Fernald (2001) estimate a similar model as BFK and use the results to look at
the cyclicality of productivity growth. As is the case with traditional growth accounting,
productivity growth is a residual. Basu and Fernald show that the traditional Solow
residual (assuming constant returns to scale and well measured inputs) is positively
correlated with output growth while the productivity residuals from their regression are
not.22 BFK show that the correlations between output and productivity residuals are
lower than the correlations between the Solow residual and output growth, but the
correlations remain signiﬁcantly positive in a number of sectors.
Although most of the estimates show returns to scale that are statistically
indistinguishable from constant and few signiﬁcant utilization effects, the point estimates
can be used to see whether these can decrease the observed procyclicality. To compare
the results in this paper with those in Basu and Fernald (2001), it is useful to start the
analysis at the level of the aggregate economies. As Basu and Fernald discuss, aggregate
TABLE 4
Estimates of Returns to Scale and a Correction for Unmeasured Input
Utilization for the United States: DifferentVariants using BFKData
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Returns to scale
Durable manufacturing 1.01 1.05 1.06 1.16n 1.15n 1.18n
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08)
Non-durable manufacturing 0.87 0.86 0.96 0.90 0.90 0.91
(0.08) (0.06) (0.09) (0.10) (0.15)
Services 1.16 0.98 0.99 0.92 0.92 1.02
(0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.10) (0.08)
Utilization correction
Durable manufacturing 1.34n 0.82n 0.53n 0.54n 0.92n 0.84n
(0.22) (0.17) (0.15) (0.18) (0.18) (0.33)
Non-durable manufacturing 2.13n 1.92n 0.54n 0.94n 1.16n 0.93n
(0.38) (0.51) (0.20) (0.42) (0.41) (0.44)
Services 0.64 0.62 0.67 2.29 2.57 0.13
(0.34) (0.61) (0.61) (1.36) (1.35) (0.35)
Notes:
BFK refers to Basu, Fernald and Kimball (2004).
nDenotes parameters signiﬁcantly different from 1 (returns to scale) or from 0 (utilization) at the 5% level.
Col. (1): Results from BFK, Table 1, using Hall–Ramey instruments, period 1949–1996, average hours included.
For returns to scale parameters, the means of industry-speciﬁc estimates for each group are shown. As
a result, no standard errors are shown.
Col. (2): Hall–Ramey instruments, period 1949–96, estimation method as in Table 3, average hours included.
Col. (3): Downstream indicators, period 1949–96, estimation method as in Table 3, average hours included.
Col. (4): Downstream indicators, period 1979–96, estimation method as in Table 3, average hours included.
Col. (5): Downstream indicators, period 1979–96, estimation method as in Table 3, average hours excluded.
Col. (6): Results from Table 3, downstream indicators, period 1979–2001, average hours excluded.
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productivity growth is calculated by aggregating industry-level residuals. However, since
these residuals are based on a gross output production function, an adjustment needs to
be made to deal with the double counting of output. Following Rotemberg and





Returns to Scale and a Correction for Unmeasured Input Utilization, excluding
Average HoursWorked from Aggregate Input Growth
Returns to scale
France Germany Netherlands USA
Market economy 1.12 1.16n 1.02 0.97
(0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.09)
Market economy excluding agriculture & mining 1.12 1.16n 1.04 1.09
(0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06)
Durable manufacturing 1.17n 1.11n 1.03 1.18n
(0.07) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08)
Non-durable manufacturing 1.32n 1.14n 1.03 0.91
(0.10) (0.06) (0.08) (0.15)
Non-manufacturing 0.93 1.18n 0.88 0.74
(0.10) (0.06) (0.11) (0.16)
Services 0.89 1.20n 0.99 1.02
(0.09) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08)
Utilization correction
Market economy  0.31 0.31 0.10 1.17n
(0.47) (0.18) (0.12) (0.34)
Market economy excluding agriculture & mining  0.21 0.29  0.02 0.72n
(0.47) (0.18) (0.08) (0.21)
Durable manufacturing  0.81 0.77n  0.20 0.84n
(0.53) (0.23) (0.22) (0.33)
Non-durable manufacturing 0.71 0.24 0.05 0.93n
(0.45) (0.27) (0.13) (0.44)
Non-manufacturing  0.71  0.08 0.50 1.49n
(0.68) (0.28) (0.26) (0.72)
Services  0.68  0.42 0.17 0.13
(0.67) (0.32) (0.16) (0.35)
Notes:
Table shows parameter estimates from a regression with output growth as the dependent variable and growth of
inputs and growth of average hours worked as independent variable. The growth of inputs is modiﬁed to
exclude growth in average hours worked. Parameters are estimated for a panel of industries, with industry ﬁxed
effects included (not shown). Parameters are estimated using two-stage least squares with the current value and
one lag of the downstream indicator for each industry as instruments. Parameters in the ﬁrst-stage regression
are allowed to vary across industries. Standard errors, consistent for heteroscedasticity and auto correlation, are
shown in parentheses.
nDenotes parameters signiﬁcantly different from 1 (returns to scale) or 0 (utilization correction) at the 5% level.
See Table A3 for deﬁnitions of industry groupings.
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where dAi is the residual from either (6a) or (6b). This residual is adjusted using the
returns-to-scale estimate g and the share of materials in gross output sMi of the industry
in question. The value-added-based productivity residuals can then be aggregated across
industries using the industry’s share in value added and correlated with value-added
growth for broad sectors or the market economy. This procedure is a more general form
of Domar (1961) aggregation, taking non-constant returns into account. Table 6 shows
the correlations between output growth and productivity residuals for all the industry
groups from Table 5. In all cases the residuals are from the full model, including both
variable returns to scale and hours worked as a proxy for input utilization.
As the top panel of Table 6 shows, in all countries but the Netherlands market
economy productivity is not signiﬁcantly correlated with output growth, and this ﬁnding
holds for (most of) manufacturing in the same set of countries. However, productivity in
non-manufacturing is still strongly procyclical in all countries, which casts some doubt
on the scope of the Basu–Fernald (2001) results.23 These doubts become even stronger
when we look at the cyclicality of individual industries. Although there are only 21
observations per industry, Hart and Malley (1999) have shown that in general there is
important heterogeneity in the cyclicality of productivity across industries, making it an
important issue to examine.
The bottom panel of Table 6 shows the number of industries for which the
correlation is signiﬁcantly different from zero, with the total number of industries in the
group. In most groupings a considerable fraction of industries has a signiﬁcantly positive
correlation, despite the fact that the cyclicality for the aggregate sector has disappeared in
many cases. Furthermore, Appendix Table A4 shows that this ﬁnding remains even when
allowing for all coefﬁcients to vary by industry. The share of industries with signiﬁcantly
positive correlations is also higher in services than in manufacturing, which is consistent
TABLE 6
Correlation between Output and Productivity Growth for Industry Groups
underVariable Returns to Scale and Corrected for Unmeasured Utilization
France Germany Netherlands USA
Output/productivity correlations, industry groups
Market economy 0.30 0.27 0.55n 0.42
Market economy excluding agriculture & mining 0.36 0.05 0.26 0.37
Durable manufacturing 0.37 0.26 0.54n 0.12
Non-durable manufacturing 0.30 0.21 0.81n 0.80n
Non-manufacturing 0.57n 0.66n 0.77n 0.60n
Services 0.59n 0.57n 0.58n 0.67n
No. of industries with correlation signiﬁcantly different from zero (5% level)
Market economy (24 industries) 9 6 14 7
Market economy excluding agriculture & mining (22) 10 4 11 4
Durable manufacturing (6) 0 1 3 1
Non-durable manufacturing (7) 1 0 2 3
Non-manufacturing (11) 7 5 10 7
Services (9) 6 3 7 4
Note:
Top panel: correlations between output growth and technical change residuals from the regressions in Table 4.
nDenotes a correlation signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 5% level.
Bottom panel: number of industries with signiﬁcantly non-zero correlations. See Table A3 for deﬁnitions of
industry groupings.
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with the signiﬁcant correlations for the sector as a whole, as well as the lack of signiﬁcant
utilization effects in the United States.
To further evaluate the robustness of this ﬁnding, Table 7 shows the share of
industries with signiﬁcantly positive correlations in the United States for a number of
alternative speciﬁcations.24 The setup is the same as for Table 6: coefﬁcients are allowed
to vary across broad industry groups, but for brevity the number of signiﬁcant
correlations is added across groups. So the 46% in the ﬁrst cell of the table is calculated
by adding the one durable manufacturing industry, three non-durables and seven non-
manufacturing industries, with signiﬁcant positive correlations and dividing by the
maximum of 24 industries in the market economy. Six different speciﬁcations are
considered. First, the Hall–Ramey instruments, as discussed in Table 2, are used instead
of the downstream indicators. Next, the productivity residuals from BFK are used, and
then in the fourth row the productivity residuals from column (5) in Table 4 are used.25
The last three speciﬁcations ﬁrst drop the industry dummies and include only a single
constant, next include year dummies, and ﬁnally include both year and industry
dummies. The main result is that, irrespective of the speciﬁcation, a noticeable fraction of
industries still shows signiﬁcantly positive correlations between output growth and the
productivity residuals. Although not shown, the signiﬁcant correlations can be found
across all industry groups. In all, this raises serious questions about the ability of the
Basu–Fernald (2001) model to explain the observed cyclicality of productivity growth,
especially when looking at individual industries and European countries.
V. CONCLUSIONS
It is important to understand why productivity growth is procyclical, both for
understanding the business cycle and for measuring productivity. This paper extends
TABLE 7
Share of US Industries with Significantly Positive Correlation between Output







Baseline (downstream indicators, industry dummies) 46% 36%
Hall–Ramey instruments (industry dummies) 58% 55%
BFK productivity residuals 38%
BFK data, downstream industries, 1979–96, ave. hours excluded 34%
Single constant (downstream indicators) 46% 32%
Time dummies (downstream indicators) 50% 32%
Industry and time dummies (downstream indicators) 71% 59%
Notes:
Shows percentage of US industries where the productivity residual is signiﬁcantly positively correlated with
output growth. Different coefﬁcients are estimated for durable manufacturing, non-durable manufacturing and
non-manufacturing or services. The number of industries with signiﬁcant correlations is added across sectors
and divided by the total number of industries in the sector (24 for the market economy, 22 if agriculture and
mining are excluded). For the speciﬁcations based on the BFK data (rows 3 and 4), the total number of
industries is 29.
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the current literature by analysing not only the United States but also France, Germany
and the Netherlands, using an up-to-date and internationally consistent industry data-set
covering the entire market economy. The analysis follows along similar lines as in Basu
and Fernald (2001): production functions are estimated to allow for non-constant returns
to scale and unmeasured input utilization, and the cyclicality of the productivity residuals
is examined.
While this study is not the ﬁrst to cover countries outside the United States, none of
those other studies have tested whether the estimated models lead to lower correlation
between growth of output and the technology residual from the production
model estimates as in Basu and Fernald (2001). Furthermore, I have introduced
industry-speciﬁc demand-side instruments to better correct for simultaneity bias in
estimation than with the more traditional aggregate demand-side variables such as oil
price changes.
The results cast doubt on the success of the Basu–Fernald (2001) model in accounting
for procyclical productivity growth. At the level of the market economy and in most of
manufacturing, the correlation between the productivity residuals from the production
function estimates and output growth is no longer signiﬁcant in France, Germany and
the United States, but in services productivity growth is still signiﬁcantly procyclical.
Furthermore, the results show that even in France, Germany and the United States a
sizeable fraction of industries still has procyclical productivity residuals, and this is
especially noticeable in services. Since the underlying theoretical model tries to explain
ﬁrm behaviour, the failing of the empirical model for many industries is worrisome.
This is not the ﬁrst paper to cast doubt on the popular explanations for procyclical
productivity growth. Basu and Fernald (1997) raised questions about the prevalence of
increasing returns to scale in the United States, while Sbordone (1997) showed that the
dynamic behaviour of output and productivity is not consistent with externalities. The
main justiﬁcation for looking at input utilization is the presence of adjustment costs for
labour and capital. However, in recent work using annual industry data, Hall (2004)
found evidence against important adjustment costs to labour and capital over a time
horizon of a year or more. As a result, it is not clear whether ﬁrms will vary utilization
very much in response to shocks at the frequency for which we observe the data. The
ﬁnding of Baily et al. (2001) that long-run downsizing plants show more procyclicality
during downturns than upsizing plants also argues against input utilization: downsizers
would have far fewer incentives to hoard labour or conserve capital.
This paper provides some direct evidence that unmeasured input utilization is unable
to account for procyclical productivity growth in many settings. One possible reason for
this may be that average hours worked per person is not a very good proxy for
unmeasured input utilization in most industries, especially outside the United States and
in the services sector. It is not clear whether this can be attributed to different work
practices outside manufacturing and the United States, problems in accurately measuring
average hours worked, or a combination of the two.
This raises the question of where to go from here. One avenue might be to try to ﬁnd
better measures for unmeasured input utilization, especially outside manufacturing. The
type of customers of an industry (business versus consumers) may be important too, as
Hart and Malley (1999) ﬁnd less evidence of procyclicality in investment goods
industries. Further theoretical research may also provide useful new directions for
empirical research. Ultimately, ﬁrm-level studies, especially extending the work of Baily
et al. (2001) beyond US manufacturing, may be needed to understand how ﬁrms adjust to
changing demand.
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APPENDIX
Tables A1–A4 give industry-level details and robustness checks of the paper’s ﬁndings.
TABLE A1
Correlation between Annual Output Growth andTotal Factor Productivity
Growth at the Industry Level: France, Germany, Netherlands and the United
States, 1979–2001
France Germany Netherlands USA
Agriculture, forestry & ﬁshing 0.87n 0.92n 0.65n 0.93n
Mining & quarrying 0.82n 0.65n 0.45n 0.32
Food products 0.05 0.32 0.38 0.54n
Textiles, clothing & leather 0.50n 0.63n 0.32 0.39
Wood products 0.44n 0.69n 0.31 0.45n
Paper, printing & publishing 0.30 0.66n 0.64n 0.50n
Petroleum & coal products 0.82n 0.39 0.40  0.01
Chemical products 0.82n 0.47n 0.63n 0.58n
Rubber & plastics 0.86n 0.51n 0.37 0.35
Non-metalic mineral products 0.39 0.88n 0.45n 0.65n
Metal products 0.64n 0.59n 0.84n 0.78n
Machinery 0.61n 0.75n 0.77n 0.73n
Electrical and electronic equipment & instruments 0.78n 0.70n  0.09 0.78n
Transport equipment 0.68n 0.57n 0.68n 0.35
Furniture & miscellaneous manufacturing 0.68n 0.79n 0.14 0.53n
Electricity, gas & water 0.69n 0.77n 0.42 0.31
Construction 0.58n  0.12 0.07 0.67n
Wholesale trade 0.19 0.44n 0.75n 0.35
Retail trade 0.61n 0.19 0.68n 0.17
Hotels & restaurants 0.44n 0.60n 0.74n 0.10
Transport & storage 0.73n 0.54n 0.78n 0.36
Communications 0.31 0.70n 0.73n 0.66n
Financial intermediation 0.80n 0.54n 0.66n 0.26
Business services 0.17 0.71n 0.05 0.35
Market economy 0.64n 0.82n 0.55n 0.77n
Note:
Total factor productivity growth is calculated as the growth of gross output minus the growth of a To¨rnqvist
aggregate of intermediate inputs, capital and labour.
TABLE A2
F-statistics for the First-Stage Regression of Instruments on Input Growth
France Germany Netherlands USA
Agriculture, forestry & ﬁshing 2.67 13.5n 1.46 1.56
Mining & quarrying 1.08 9.40n 0.29 1.51
Food products 19.4nn 3.36 13.8n 11.1n
Textiles, clothing & leather 8.84 18.3nn 6.76 5.99
Wood products 2 1.04 2.08 5.6
Paper, printing & publishing 18.9nn 26.4nn 6.53 16.7nn
Petroleum & coal products 1.54 2.4 0.91 1.2
Chemical products 8.63 4.75 6.26 6.69
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TABLE A2
CONTINUED
France Germany Netherlands USA
Rubber & plastics 17.0nn 25.5nn 14.7nn 40.1nn
Non-metalic mineral products 15.0nn 0.48 2.56 7.63
Metal products 4.47 26.4nn 3.13 8.67
Machinery 9.22n 12.9n 21.5nn 7.69
Electrical and electronic equipment & instruments 22.5nn 18.7nn 29.6nn 18.6nn
Transport equipment 29.3nn 11.5n 5.92 7.06
Furniture & miscellaneous manufacturing 0.23 2.97 8.31 5.96
Electricity, gas & water 10.3n 5.25 8.95 1.02
Construction 9.91n 4.71 10.8n 5.03
Wholesale trade 3.08 6.12 28.0nn 6.04
Retail trade 12.8n 0.89 19.1nn 12.2n
Hotels & restaurants 27.9nn 32.4nn 12.5n 17.2nn
Transport & storage 35.2nn 6.74 12.2n 26.8nn
Communications 9.93n 4.57 15.7nn 20.1nn
Financial intermediation 14.4nn 4.83 41.9nn 7.39
Business services 39.6nn 26.8nn 53.0nn 83.3nn
Market economy 13.5n 11.2n 13.6n 13.5n
Note:
nBias is less than 10% of OLS bias.
nnBias is less than 5% of OLS bias.
Instruments are the current value and one lag of industry-speciﬁc downstream indicators.
Signiﬁcance is determined using critical values from Table 1 of Stock and Yogo (2004). Critical 5% value is
13.91, the 10% value is 9.08.
TABLE A3
Returns-to-Scale Estimates at the Industry Level, based on EQUATION (6a)
Ind.
group France Germany Netherlands USA
Agriculture, forestry & ﬁshing NMFG 1.69 2.1 0.49 1.41
Mining & quarrying NMFG 1.53 1.65  0.23  0.73n
Food products NDUR 0.26n 0.64  1 1.93
Textiles, clothing & leather NDUR 1.64 1.19n 1.02 1.19
Wood products NDUR 1.09 1.21 0.75 0.99
Paper, printing & publishing NDUR 1 1.15 1.21 1.12
Petroleum & coal products NDUR 1.19 1.12 0.93 0.15n
Chemical products NDUR 1.25 1.3 0.75 1.3
Rubber and plastics NDUR 1.57n 1.11 1.18 1.1
Non-metalic mineral products DUR 0.99 1.59n 1.13 1.28
Metal products DUR 1.19 1.1 1.37n 1.20n
Machinery DUR 1.14 1.20n 1.28n 1.25n
Electrical and electronic equipment
& instruments
DUR 1.37n 1.08 0.94 1.44n
Transport equipment DUR 1.31n 1.16 1.15n 1.11
Furniture & miscellaneous manufacturing DUR 2.27 1.41n 0.8 1.44
Electricity, gas & water SER/NMFG 0.17n 1.09 1.2 0.01
Construction SER/NMFG 1.18 0.88 0.92 1.11
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group France Germany Netherlands USA
Wholesale trade SER/NMFG 1.13 1.25n 1.31 1.07
Retail trade SER/NMFG 0.76  2.31 1.27 1.54
Hotels & restaurants SER/NMFG 1.22 1.38n 1.1 0.82
Transport & storage SER/NMFG 1.24 1.24n 1.22 0.84
Communications SER/NMFG 0.83 0.95 0.86 0.71
Financial intermediation SER/NMFG 0.55 0.79 0.37 0.63
Business services SER/NMFG 1.02 1.34n 1.05 1.08
Market economy 1.15n 1.09 1.01 1.11n
Notes:
Ind. group denotes the group in which the industry is included; DUR ¼ durable manufacturing;
NDUR ¼ non-durable manufacturing; SER ¼ services; NMFG ¼ non-manufacturing.
Table shows parameter estimates from a regression with output growth as the dependent variable and growth of
inputs as independent variable; a constant was also included. Estimation is industry-by-industry using two-stage
least squares with the current value and one lag of the downstream indicator for each industry as instruments.
Standard errors, consistent for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, are shown in parentheses.
nDenotes parameters signiﬁcantly different from 1 at the 5% level.
TABLE A4
Correlation between Output and Productivity Growth, based on Industry-
by-Industry Estimates of Returns to Scale and Unmeasured Input Utilization
France Germany Netherlands USA
Market economy
Constant returns to scale 0.72n 0.82n 0.51n 0.85n
Variable returns to scale 0.17 0.37  0.00 0.25
Variable returns to scale and utilization correction 0.04 0.12  0.10  0.02
No. of market industries with correlation signiﬁcantly different from zero (5% level)
Constant returns to scale 18 20 14 13
Variable returns to scale 11 9 12 8
Variable returns to scale & utilization correction 5 8 8 5
Note:
Correlations between output growth and technical change residuals.
nDenotes a correlation signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 5% level. The deﬁnitions of productivity residuals
are similar to Table 5, but in this table the parameters are allowed to vary for each industry.
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NOTES
1. See Basu and Fernald (2001) for a more extensive overview of these explanations; they also include
reallocation of resources across sectors as an explanation at the aggregate level. As the focus of this
chapter is mostly on the limits of their model at the industry level, it is not discussed any further here.
2. Increases in government expenditure increase (future) taxes, and thereby reduce labour income and
hence labour supply. However, increases in government expenditure also increase output and thereby
labour supply. Under imperfect competition the former effect dominates the latter, leading to a larger
effect of government expenditure increases on output than on employment; see the survey by
Rotemberg and Woodford (1995).
3. The literature on short-run externalities is rather unclear about the exact nature of these spillovers.
Long-run externalities are generally related to knowledge spillovers, but to explain short-run
externalities the authors at most state that ‘thick markets’ are responsible; in other words, more
activity in one market ‘spills over’ to other markets. See Bartelsman et al. (1994) for a discussion.
4. See e.g. Hall (1988, 1990); Roeger (1995); Oliveira Martins et al. (1996); Basu and Fernald (1997) and
Diewert and Fox (2004) on returns to scale and markups. Markups and returns to scale are comparable
as economic proﬁts are generally modest. See Caballero and Lyons (1990, 1992); Bartelsman et al.
(1994); Sbordone (1997) and Vecchi (2000) on externalities. See e.g. Berndt and Fuss (1986); Basu and
Kimball (1997); Burnside et al. (1995); Burnside (1996); Hart and Malley (1996); Vecchi (2000); Basu
and Fernald (2001) and Basu et al. (2001) on labour hoarding and correcting for unmeasured input
utilization. Finally, Basu and Fernald (2001) and Basu et al. (2001) stress the importance of
reallocations between sectors.
5. Marchetti and Nucci (2005) use ﬁrm-level data for Italy to look also at correlations of productivity
residuals and the cycle, but their approach is somewhat different.
6. Similar types of model are presented in many of the referenced papers. A model that leads to the same
estimating equation is given in Basu and Fernald (2001).
7. Another theoretical mechanism commonly used is to assume that if capital is used more intensively
machinery wears out more quickly and depreciation is higher (see e.g. Imbs 2003). However, the shift
premium ﬁts more closely with the utilization proxy used here. See Basu and Kimball (1997) for a model
that explicitly combines both mechanisms.
8. See Hart and Malley (1996) for arguments along these lines.
9. An alternative would be to use constant shares over the full period, but this has only a small impact on
the results discussed in Section III.
10. Basu et al. (2001, 2004) use the cyclical part of average hours worked instead of the growth in average
hours worked. In practice, they estimate close to a linear trend, so only the mean growth of average
hours worked is removed, with no impact on parameter estimates.
11. The next section also discusses an adjustment to equation (5) to take this problem into account for
growth in average hours worked.
12. Basu et al. (2001) also spend considerable effort on including adjustment costs in their output and input
measures, calibrated using the estimates of Shapiro (1996). While in theory this has merit, Hall (2004)
ﬁnds relatively strong evidence against adjustment costs for capital or labour using US industry data.
Outside the United States, the evidence is even scarcer so such adjustments are omitted.
13. These instruments are the current value and one lag of the change in the oil price relative to the GDP
deﬂator and the growth of real government spending. The political party of the president is excluded, as
it has no straightforward counterpart in other countries and is usually the weakest instrument of the
three (e.g. Hall 1988). Similarly, military expenditure is broadened to all government spending for easier
cross-country comparability. Monetary policy shocks have also been used sometimes in studies in the
United States, but comparable measures are not available for the European countries.
14. F-statistics for individual industries in each country are shown in Appendix Table A2.
15. As Basu and Fernald (1997, p. 258) note, the ﬁrst-stage F-statistic of equation (6a) using the Hall–
Ramey instruments is around 3 using their data, which is comparable to the results in Table 2.
16. Usually a term reﬂecting corporate taxes and investment credits is also included in equation (7).
However, as Erumban (2004) shows, taxes have only a limited effect on capital input growth, so these
terms are omitted here.
17. To be precise, both industry-by-industry and product-by-industry [use] tables are used. Industry-by-
industry tables are conceptually to be preferred, but in practice differences will be modest.
18. It would also be efﬁciency-enhancing to explicitly take into account any cross-sectional dependence of
the residuals in a three-stage least squares or GMM procedure. However, the cross-sectional dimension
is not large enough to yield reliable estimates. Pesaran (2004) suggests an alternative procedure if the
errors have a factor structure, which involves adding the cross-industry (weighted) averages of the
dependent and independent variables to the regression. However, in an economic sense this would be a
speciﬁcation that attempts to test for external effects as in Caballero and Lyons (1990, 1992). To avoid
such complications, two-stage least squares is used.
19. The full country results are included in the working paper version, which can be found as GGDC
Research Memorandum GD-74 at www.ggdc.net.
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20. Many thanks go to John Fernald for making these data available.
21. BFK use a GMM procedure to enhance efﬁciency. The instruments that they use are oil price increases,
growth in real defence spending and monetary policy shocks. The monetary policy shocks are available
only for the United States, so they are not used in Table 2 when comparing the relevance of the
instruments. The relatively modest differences between columns (2) and (3) suggest that these monetary
policy shocks are relatively relevant, although ﬁrst-stage F-statistics suggest that downstream indicators
still have an advantage.
22. In general, productivity growth from these regressions is equal to the constant plus the residual.
However, average productivity growth is not relevant for cyclicality.
23. They show comparable correlations only for the private economy and the overall manufacturing sector.
24. The results for other countries are very similar, and are available upon request from the author.
25. Results for the intermediate speciﬁcations are similar.
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